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The role of fillers in listener attributions for
speaker disfluency
Dale J. Barr
University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
Mandana Seyfeddinipur
Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
When listeners hear a speaker become disfluent, they expect the speaker to refer
to something new. What is the mechanism underlying this expectation? In a
mouse-tracking experiment, listeners sought to identify images that a speaker
was describing. Listeners more strongly expected new referents when they
heard a speaker say um than when they heard a matched utterance where the
um was replaced by noise. This expectation was speaker-specific: it depended
on what was new and old for the current speaker, not just on what was new or
old for the listener. This finding suggests that listeners treat fillers as collateral
signals.
Keywords: Common ground; Dialogue; Disfluency; Fillers; Perspective taking.
In spontaneous discourse, speakers often fail to maintain fluent speech.
Speakers hesitate, repeat words (the the red one), prolong vowels (theeee
other one) or produce so-called ‘fillers’ uh or um (it’s um blue). How do these
disfluencies impact comprehension? Traditionally, disfluencies were seen as
potentially harmful to the comprehension process (e.g., Martin & Strange,
1968). However, recent psycholinguistic research has shown that disfluencies
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can actually benefit comprehension. Hearing a disfluency can help listeners
avoid integrating potentially erroneous material into an ongoing parse
(Brennan & Schober, 2001; Fox Tree, 2001) or can relax contextually driven
expectations about upcoming words (Corley, MacGregor, & Donaldson,
2007). Disfluencies can also lead listeners to expect a dispreferred syntactic
structure (Bailey & Ferreira, 2003) or syntactically complex descriptions
(Watanabe, Hirose, Den, & Minematsu, 2008). In addition, disfluencies
influence listeners’ discourse-level expectations. Following a disfluency,
listeners may expect the speaker to shift topic (Swerts, 1998; Swerts &
Geluykens, 1994). Listeners also expect that a disfluent speaker may be
about to refer to something that is difficult to describe, whether this difficulty
stems from the referent’s novelty (Arnold, Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano,
2004; Barr, 2001), its lack of a conventional name (Arnold, Hudson Kam, &
Tanenhaus, 2007), or its atypicality (Barr, 2003). Finally, disfluencies impact
listeners’ attributions of a speaker’s level of certainty (Brennan & Williams,
1995), production difficulty, honesty, and comfort with the topic (Fox
Tree, 2002).
Despite the substantial evidence that disfluencies benefit comprehension,
questions regarding the nature of this benefit remain. First, disfluent
speech contains diverse elements: silent pauses, repeated words, prolonged
vowels, and the fillers uh or um. Which of these elements is responsible for
the observed comprehension benefits? Fillers might play a special role,
given the theoretical view that they are collateral signals used to manage
the conversation (Clark, 1996; Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). Speakers pause
longer after um than after uh, suggesting that they use um to signal major
delays and uh to signal minor delays (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; Smith &
Clark, 1993). Finding that listeners treat fillers as signals of delay would be
supporting evidence for the collateral signal account (although this need
not imply that speakers actually produce fillers with the intent to signal
delay).
Currently, the evidence is equivocal as to whether fillers by themselves
influence language comprehension. To find such independent effects, it is
necessary to control for other characteristics of the disfluencies that contain
fillers. Some studies have compared the processing of disfluent utterances
containing a filler to the processing of fluent utterances (e.g., Arnold et al.,
2004, 2007; Corley et al., 2007). But in these studies, the disfluent utterances
differed from the fluent utterances not only by having fillers, but also by
having a pause following the filler and possibly even other differences in
prosody. As such, these studies do not isolate the effects of fillers from the
effects of other characteristics. Studies that have controlled for the influence
of other characteristics have not yielded uniform findings. Some studies that
have controlled for the length of surrounding pauses using splicing
techniques suggest that fillers do not impact comprehension above and











































beyond the extra processing time they buy for the listener (Bailey & Ferreira,
2003; Brennan & Schober, 2001). Yet other studies do suggest independent
effects. Fox Tree (2001) found that uh aided listeners in recognising upcoming
words, whereas um did not. Also, Barr (2001) found that listeners more
strongly expected the speaker to refer to something new after um than after
noise (e.g., a cough or a sniffle). However, this effect could be interference
from the noise rather than facilitation due to um. Finally, Fox Tree (2002)
also found effects of um using stimuli matched for duration, but only looked
at overhearers’ offline ratings and not at their online comprehension
processes.
If independent effects of fillers can be demonstrated, then this would raise
the question of how they influence comprehension processes. The claim in
the literature to date has been that disfluencies constrain the moment-
by-moment processing of referring expressions. In apparent support of this
hypothesis, eyetracking studies have found effects of disfluency over a time
window corresponding to the processing of the referring expression (Arnold
et al., 2004, 2007). For example, Arnold et al. (2004) found effects of the
disfluency 200600 ms after the onset of the word ‘camel’ in the disfluent
utterance ‘click on thee uh. . . camel’. However, such analyses can be
misleading about the time course of effects, because they confound effects
that emerge during the time window with ‘anticipation’ effects that may have
emerged earlier and that persist over the time window (Barr, 2008a, 2008b).
It is possible, then, the expectation for the new referent emerged entirely
during the ‘click on thee uh. . .’ part of the utterance, making listeners more
likely to look at new referents, but that it did not constrain how the word
‘camel’ was processed. In sum, because these studies do not control for such
anticipation effects, they cannot rule out an alternative interpretation for
their data: namely, that disfluency creates an expectation for something new
(causing listeners to look more at a new referent overall) without this
expectation constraining the moment-by-moment processing of the referring
expression itself. Distinguishing these possibilities requires an analysis that
can separate these different processing events.
Time-course issues aside, fillers can cause listeners to expect new referents
based on two different underlying mechanisms. One possibility is that
listeners who hear an um derive expectations by taking the speaker’s
perspective. This perspective taking account is consistent with the assumption
that fillers have a core meaning of delay, and that listeners work out the
reasons for the delay from contextual evidence and cooperative assumptions
(Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). This implies that listeners’ expectations should be
speaker-specific; in other words, listeners should be guided by their beliefs
about what would cause trouble for this particular speaker in this particular
context.











































However, an alternative possibility is that listeners rely on co-occurrences
between features of disfluencies and certain events in speech, making
perspective taking unnecessary. Under this distributional learning account,
listeners do not make attributions to speakers who delay. Instead, their
expectations are driven by a more passive memory process that generates
predictions based on statistical regularities. For instance, listeners might
associate the presence of a filler with new information, given that speakers
are more likely to produce a filler when they refer to something new (Arnold,
Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004; Barr, 2001). Such knowledge about
co-occurrences could enable listeners to benefit from fillers without requiring
perspective taking, because it is often the case that what is new for the
speaker is also new for the listener (because they share a conversational
history).
Against this account, there is evidence that listeners who hear
disfluencies containing fillers, silent pauses, and prolongations generate
expectations that are specific to the person speaking. In a study by Arnold
et al. (2007), listeners who heard a disfluent utterance from a normal
speaker (click on thee uh. . .) expected the speaker to refer to something
difficult to describe (an unusual shape) rather than an everyday object (e.g.,
an apple). But when listeners were told that the speaker had difficulty
recognising everyday objects (object agnosia), they also expected that the
speaker would have difficulty naming them, and so they no longer
anticipated reference to the difficult object. Although this demonstrates
that listeners make attributions that are speaker-specific, it is not yet clear
whether these attributions are driven by fillers themselves. Furthermore,
Arnold et al. (2007) did not find evidence that listeners could change their
expectations on a trial-by-trial basis, so it is unclear how flexibly listeners
can make these attributions.
In sum, we have identified three outstanding questions in the disfluency
literature with respect to fillers: (1) Do fillers influence comprehension above
and beyond other characteristics of disfluencies? (2) Do fillers influence the
processing of referring expressions, or only create an anticipation effect? (3)
Are effects of fillers driven by perspective taking or by distributional
learning? We report the results of an experiment that investigated these
questions by examining listeners’ expectations for new referents following
disfluency (Arnold et al., 2004; Barr, 2001). We focused on disfluencies that
take place at the beginning of a speaking turn. This allowed us to cleanly
isolate the effects of fillers on comprehension from other characteristics of
disfluent speech (e.g., speaking rate, prosody, etc.).
We conducted a referential communication experiment in which
participants interpreted utterances from two different speakers while
movements of a computer mouse were tracked. Mouse tracking provides
sensitive information about the time course of cognitive processing











































(Brennan, 1990, 2005; Magnuson, 2005; Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich,
2005). In each trial of the experiment, the listener heard a speaker describe
one of two abstract images presented on a computer screen, and used the
mouse to click on the corresponding image. We manipulated whether the
descriptions contained a filler (um) or noise (a cough or a sniffle). If there
are independent effects of fillers, then listeners should expect new
information more when they hear an um than when they hear noise. To
localise the effect of the filler, we analysed two subsequent time windows.
The first began at the onset of the um (or noise) and ended at the onset of
the referring expression. The second began where the first ended and
extended into the early moments of the referring expression. We also
manipulated whether the listener’s and speaker’s perspectives matched or
mismatched in terms of what images were old and what images were new. If
listeners take the speaker’s perspective into account, following an um they
should expect something that is new for the speaker, and not something
that is only new for themselves. However, if listeners rely on distributional
learning, they should expect something new for themselves independently
of what is old and new for the speaker.
METHOD
Subjects
Ninety-two undergraduates (58 females) from the University of California,
Riverside participated for course credit. All identified themselves as native
speakers of English.
Task
In each trial in the experiment, listeners saw two abstract images and heard
pre-recorded speech describing one of the images. The speech came from one
of two speakers, a male or a female. The listeners’ task was to click on the
image the speaker was describing (the target).
The trials were organised into blocks. Each block had four trials followed
by a single test trial (see Figure 1). The first four trials set up what images
were old or new for the listener and for a given speaker. The images used in
each block were drawn from a set of three, which we refer to as A, B, and C.
For example, the listener might hear the male speaker describe image A in
the first trial, image B in the second, image B again in the third, and then
image A again in the fourth. So, after the fourth trial, image A and B had
been described two times each and were therefore OLD for both the male
speaker and the listener. In contrast, image C had only appeared as the











































context image (in the first three trials) but had never been described. This
made it NEW for both the male speaker and the listener.
In the test trial that immediately followed, we introduced our two main
manipulations. In this trial, images B and C appeared, and listeners heard a
disfluent description of image C that either contained an um or noise
(a cough or sniffle). The description was given either by the same speaker
who gave the four filler trials, or by a different speaker. This speaker
manipulation determined whether the perspectives of the speaker and
listener matched or mismatched. If the speaker at test was the same speaker
who gave the descriptions for the first four trials, the perspectives matched:
for both the listener and the speaker, B was old and C was new. If it was a
different speaker, then the perspectives mismatched: for the listener, B was
old and C was new, but for the speaker, both B and C were new, since that
speaker had not yet described any images for that block.
Procedure
We told listeners that the speech was from previous participants who had
completed the task on separate sessions with different participants playing
the role of listener. At the beginning of each trial, the mouse cursor
appeared at the exact centre of the screen, halfway between the inner edges
of the two images. Playback of the audio file began simultaneously with the
appearance of the images. We encouraged listeners not to wait to the end
of a description but to click on the image as soon as they thought they
knew which one it was.
The four trials preceding the test trial presented image pairs A-C, B-C,
B-C, A-B (with the first of each listed pair being the target). The order of
these four non-test trials varied across blocks, and the position of the target
on the screen (right or left side) also varied from trial to trial and from block
to block. The test trial for each block presented image pair C and B. Image
Figure 1. Sample block from the experiment, including four filler trials followed by a test trial.
The black dot denotes the target image for a given trial (the dot and the words ‘new’ and ‘old’ are
for expository purposes  they were not visible to the subject).











































C, which was new for both the speaker and listener, was always the target.
The position of the target varied from block to block.
There were 24 blocks of five trials each in the experiment, for a total of
120 trials. Twelve of the blocks were ‘experimental’ and ended with a test
trial; the remaining 12 were filler blocks. These blocks were structured
identically to the experimental blocks, with the exception that the image
mentioned on the fifth trial was image B. This made it impossible to predict
which image would be mentioned on the fifth trial (B or C).
Because our critical measurements were taken during the test trial, we
wanted to make this trial as comparable as possible across conditions. Thus,
we kept the speaker for test trial constant: it was always the female speaker.
We created the speaker manipulation by varying the speaker for the first four
trials in the block (see Figure 1). For half of the experimental blocks, the
speaker for the first four trials was the male speaker, thus creating the
Different Speaker condition. For the other half, it was the female speaker,
creating the Same Speaker condition. The filler blocks were constructed
identically. The fifth trial was always given by the female speaker, and the
preceding four trials were given either by the male speaker (six blocks) or by
the female speaker (six blocks).
At the beginning of each block, and just before the fifth trial of the same
block, listeners were informed of the identity of the upcoming speaker. The
name of the female or the male speaker appeared centred on the screen for
2500 ms.
Materials
The displays for each block presented pairs of images drawn from a set of
three images that were seen only in that block. The two images in each
display were centred vertically and positioned horizontally at the left and
right sides of a 15-inch computer monitor with the resolution set to 1024
768 pixels. The dimensions of each image were 400400 pixels. The inner
edge of each image was 100 pixels away from the vertical midline of the
screen (where the mouse cursor initially appeared).
The speakers recorded the stimuli without a script. Their recordings were
made independently, so they would lack knowledge of one another’s
descriptions. Given that the test trials involved descriptions by the female
speaker, the characteristics of the male speaker’s descriptions are not
described further.
The female speaker’s description of image C for each block was digitally
altered for use in the test trial. We altered the hesitation at the beginning of
the utterance to fit certain parameters observed in a pilot production study.
Each sound file in the um condition began with a 3056 ms interval of
background noise, followed by an um that was spliced in from another











































utterance of the speaker (unless the speaker naturally produced an um for
that description, in which case the silences around the um were altered to
match the desired parameters). Additional background noise was spliced in
after the um such that the onset of the referring expression would begin at
4871 ms. For the baseline condition, the um was replaced with incidental
vocal noise (e.g., a sniffle or a cough), and the trailing silence was altered
so that description onset would take place at 4871 ms.
We created four lists so that each experimental block would appear an
equal number of times in each of the four conditions (Same Speaker-um,
Same Speaker-noise, Different Speaker-um, Different Speaker-noise). Each
listener was presented with the stimuli from one of these four lists. The
blocks were presented in a random order.
Analysis
Our analyses only considered the horizontal coordinates of the cursor,
because the listener had to move the cursor horizontally but not vertically
to select a picture. The cursor position was recorded in screen pixels, but
we converted the measure into a more meaningful distance score: the
proportion of the total distance travelled by the cursor, with the total
distance defined as the distance the midline to the border of either picture.
Positive distances reflect positioning in the direction of the target (which
was always new for both the speaker and the listener). Negative values
reflect positioning in the direction of the image that was old for the
listener. A value of zero means that the cursor was centred at the midline.
Any time the cursor moved beyond the inner edge of a picture, the distance
was coded as 1.0 (for new image) or 1.0 (for the image that was old for
the listener).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For all analyses, trials in which the incorrect referent was selected were
discarded (29 out of 1104, or 2.6%). We analysed the data using linear mixed-
effects regression. We estimated models using the lmer and pvals.fnc
functions from packages lme4 (Bates, 2007) and languageR (Baayen, 2007)
of the R software environment (R Development Core Team, 2007). Each
mixed-effect model included subjects and items as crossed random effects,
and p-values were obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling (Baayen, 2008; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The two
independent variables, Speaker (Same, Different) and Disfluency Condition
(um, noise) were dummy coded and then mean-centred so that parameter
estimates would correspond to main effects and interactions in an ANOVA
model. Since both factors were administered within subjects and within











































items, with multiple observations per subject and item for each treatment
combination, the model included not only by-subject and by-item random
intercepts, but also by-subject and by-item random slopes for the main
effects as well as for the interaction.1
When interpreting the results, it is important to recall that the target
image was always new for both the speaker and the listener and the context
image was always old for the listener. Whether the context image was new or
old for the speaker depended on whether the speaker was the same or
different. The distributional learning account predicts that listeners will
identify the target faster following um than following noise, regardless of
what is new or old for the speaker. In contrast, the collateral signal account
predicts that listeners should identify the target faster following um than
noise when the target is new and the context is old for the speaker (Same
Speaker condition), but not when both images are new for the speaker
(Different Speaker condition).
The time-course of mouse movement, averaged over subjects and items, is
presented in Figure 2. The first analysis (Table 1) examined the distance that
the mouse travelled toward the target during the filled interval (from the
onset of the um or noise up to the onset of the referring expression). This
analysis supported the collateral signal account: the filler um produced a
speaker-specific expectation for new information prior to the first word of
the referring expression (i.e., there was a significant interaction; t2.37, p
.011). When listeners heard the same speaker say um, they moved the mouse
about 10% more toward the target than following noise (t2.83, p.014).
Figure 2. Time-course data for mouse cursor position. Shaded areas represent91 standard
error of the difference between the um and noise conditions for a given level of Speaker.
1 At the time of writing, lme4 version 0.999375-28 did not provide MCMC p-values for
models including correlations among the random effects, so these correlations were not included
in any of the models. To check on our results, we reproduced each analysis with models including
these correlation parameters, and used the regular p-values (from Wald z tests). All effects that
were significant in the original analyses were also significant using the regular p-values.











































In contrast, when they listened to a new speaker, for whom both images were
new, listeners did not significantly move closer to the target after hearing um
than after hearing noise (t1.05, p.319); in fact the numerical trend was
3% in the opposite direction. No other effects were significant.
Given that the filler produced an anticipation effect, did it also facilitate
processing of the referring expression? If so, then during the referring
expression itself, listeners who hear the same speaker say um should move
toward the new target faster than those who hear noise. This effect, in turn,
should be greater than that for listeners who listen to a different speaker. For
each trial, we conducted an analysis of the change in distance starting where
the previous analysis left off (i.e., at the end of the silent interval following
um or noise), and ending 2600 ms into the referring expression. We chose a
2600 ms window because this corresponds to the length of the shortest
referring expression. This way, none of the effects in this window could be
due to any post-processing taking place after the expression had ended. Also
note that this analysis also controls for the anticipation effects that were
already present at the beginning of the window.
The analysis indicated that when listeners processed the referring
expression, they were only sensitive to the identity of the speaker, but
not to the presence of an um versus noise (Table 1). Listeners moved faster
toward the new referent when listening to the same rather than a different
speaker (t1.90, p.053). This main effect of speaker is not surprising, as
it only indicates that listeners pay a processing cost when they listen to a
speaker different from the one who gave descriptions on the previous four
trials. Critically, during the processing of the referring expression there was
no evidence for any speaker-specific effect of the filler (interaction term,
t0.152, p.879), nor of any overall effect of um versus noise (t0.517,
p.631). In sum, the filler produced an anticipation effect, but there was
TABLE 1
Mean distance travelled by the mouse cursor
Noise um
M SD M SD
Filled interval (01871 ms)
Same speaker .01 .38 .11 .51
Different speaker .04 .32 .01 .38
Referring expression (18714471 ms)
Same speaker .68 .56 .67 .56
Different speaker .59 .61 .57 .72











































no evidence that it facilitated the processing of the referring expression
itself.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings reported in this experiment contribute to the understanding of
how people process disfluent speech by providing greater detail about the
source of the effects and their time-course, as well as offering insight into the
underlying mechanism. First, the filler um can cause listeners to expect new
information independently of other characteristics of the disfluency. Second,
the mechanism underlying this effect is a perspective-taking process that is
deployed upon hearing a filler. These findings support the predictions of the
collateral signal account for language comprehension. Finally, we found that
fillers induced an anticipation effect, but did not appear to influence the
moment-by-moment processing of the referring expression itself.
Replicating Barr (2001), listeners expected new referents when they heard
a pause including an um, but not when they heard a pause that was matched
for duration and that included noise (e.g., a cough) instead of the um. But
although the effect in Barr (2001) could be explained as a consequence of
disruption due to the noise, rather than facilitation due to the filler, the
current effect cannot be explained in this way. Such an explanation account
would predict that the noise would disrupt comprehension equally across the
two speaker conditions. Instead, there was clear evidence for a difference
between um and noise only when the speaker was the same. The time-course
data suggested that this speaker-specific effect of um emerged one second
after the onset of the filler, even before the first word of the referring
expression.
Not only did we find an independent effect of um, but we also showed that
perspective taking is the mechanism underlying this effect. Listeners who
heard an um followed by a long pause directed attention toward referents
that were new for the person speaking. When both referents were new for the
speaker, listeners did not expect the speaker to make reference to information
that was new for themselves. This finding cannot be explained by a
distributional learning account, which assumes an association between um
and information that is new for the listener.
Perhaps one could save the distributional learning account by assuming
that listeners initially interpreted the um from their own perspective, and then
corrected this interpretation. This explanation would be in line with the
Perspective Adjustment model of Keysar and colleagues (Barr & Keysar,
2006; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner,
2000). In the Different Speaker condition, listeners who heard um may have
initially considered the image that was new for themselves, and only later











































realised that both images were new for the speaker. However, this
explanation seems implausible. A central assumption of Perspective Adjust-
ment is that the adjustment process is insufficient, resulting in an
interpretation that is biased toward the listener’s knowledge. So, listeners
should show some expectation for the target following an um even when they
listened to a different speaker. Contrary to this prediction, there was no
suggestion whatsoever of an expectation for the target when the speaker was
different; in fact, the trend was in the opposite direction.
It is interesting that the speaker-specific effect of the filler was wholly
localised to the interval prior to the onset of the referring expression.
Although hearing an um led listeners to expect reference to something new
for the speaker, surprisingly, this expectation did not appear to modulate
how they processed the referring expression itself. In that respect, this
‘anticipation without integration’ is consistent with recent findings that
listeners can use information about a speaker’s perspective to anticipate what
the speaker will refer to, but are unable to integrate this information into
lexical processing (Barr, 2008b).
Viewed in this way, the results from our mouse-tracking study would
appear to be inconsistent with claims made from eye-tracking studies that
disfluencies modulate moment-by-moment referential processing (Arnold
et al., 2004, 2007). However, as mentioned above, the analyses in these
studies confound effects of disfluency on anticipation with effects on
referential processing itself. It is possible, then, that the effects in these
studies are largely anticipatory in nature. Further research is needed to
disentangle these possibilities.
Timing issues aside, the finding that effects of um are speaker-specific
further supports the idea that listeners interpret disfluencies flexibly (Arnold
et al., 2007). However, our findings indicate an even greater flexibility than
has been previously shown. Arnold et al. (2007) found that listeners were less
likely to expect something difficult to describe when they believed the
speaker had a cognitive impairment (object agnosia). However, they did not
find that listeners were less likely to expect something difficult to describe
when the attribution varied from trial to trial; specifically, when listeners
could attribute the disfluency to distraction provoked by an external source
(loud noise, beep) rather than to difficulty arising internally from the
encoding process itself. In contrast, listeners in the current study were able to
make the appropriate attribution to the speaker even when the possible
attributions varied from one trial to the next.
It is possible to explain this discrepancy in two distinct ways. First, in
Arnold et al. (2007), listeners received evidence that the speaker was
distracted within one second of the disfluency. They suggest that this may
not have given listeners enough time to attribute the disfluency to the
distraction. In contrast, in our study, listeners knew who would be speaking











































prior to the beginning of the trial. Therefore, they had plenty of time to
access given-new status from the speaker’s perspective. Indeed, listeners
probably routinely track given-new status because it is relevant for many
linguistic processes. So in that sense, the attribution may have been easier for
listeners to make.
The collateral signal account offers a second explanation for the
discrepancy with Arnold et al. (2007): namely, listeners should not expect
speakers to use fillers to account for disruptions that speakers themselves are
not responsible for, particularly when the reasons for the disruption are
available to the listener. For example, imagine a speaker who decides to stop
speaking because of loud environmental noise (e.g., a jackhammer or a
passing plane). Although the speaker will delay speaking until the noise has
ceased, it is not self-evident that she would mark her anticipation using a
filler. She does not need to account for the delay because the reasons for the
delay would be obvious to the listener. Although listeners in the Arnold et al.
(2007) experiment indicated on a post-experiment questionnaire that they
believed the noise to have been distracting, the presence of fillers in the
speech may still have led them to believe that it was an unobserved difficulty,
rather than the observed distraction, that produced the disfluency.
In closing, our findings support the collateral signal account of Clark and
Fox Tree (2002) for language comprehension. Whether or not speakers
actually produce fillers with the intention to signal delay, it is clear that
listeners interpret fillers as delay signals, and infer plausible reasons for the
delay by taking the speaker’s perspective. One interesting possibility
suggested by these results is that fillers are used not only to manage the
conversation, but also have a kind of metacognitive function, drawing the
listener’s attention to the mind of the speaker. It is an open question whether
such a metacognitive function of fillers can explain the various benefits that
disfluencies bring to language comprehension.
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